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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Problem 
Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (c. 35 - c. 95 A.D.) taught rhetoric 
in the city of Rome and retired after 20 years of service. His retire-
ment was interrupted when he was asked to write a treatise on the art 
of speaking. His friends desired such a work since " ... previous 
writers on the subject had expressed different and at times contra-
d . . . "1 ic tory op in ions. Therefore, Quintilian, after two years work, 
2 published his book Institutes of Oratory (c. 93 A.D.). This treatise, 
though written especially for the education of Marcellus Victorius' 
3 
son, Geta, sets forth the basic educational philosophy of Quintilian. 
He says: 
My aim, then, is the education of the perfect orator. The 
first essential for such an one is that he should be a good 
man, and consequently we demand of him not merely the 
possession of exceptional gifts of speech, but of all the 
excellences of character as well . . • The man who can 
really play his part as a citizen and is capable of meeting 
the demands both of public and private business, the man 
who can guide a state by his counsels, give it a firm 
basis by his legislation and purge its vices by his 
decisions as a judge is assuredly no other than the orator 
of our quest. 4 
Also, "Perfect eloquence is assuredly a reality, which is not beyond the 
reach of human intellect. 115 Up to this point Quintilian had echoed the 
traditional goals of many educators, viz., Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
and Cicero; but his next proclamation seems not only to set him apart 
1 
from the earlier schools of thought but expresses his major educational 
claim. He continues: 
The orator then, whom I am concerned to form, shall be the 
orator as defined by Marcus Cato, 'a good man, skilled in 
speaking.' But above all he must possess the quality which 
Cato places first and which is in the very nature of things 
the greatest and most important, that is, he must be a good 
man . . . For I do not merely asset that the ideal orator 
should be a good man, but I affirm that no man can be an 
orator unless he is a good man.6 
Thus, for Quintilian, the greatest and most important quality that every 
orator should possess is moral virtue; and, though Quintilian is 
interested in the education of the orator, he claims that no man can be 
an orator unless he is a good man. Further, he contends, the goal of 
education should be the production of the good man skilled in the art 
of effective speech. One of the difficulties found in Quintilian's 
claim is whether educators can produce such orators. A second problem 
with his claim is whether Quintilian's rhetorical educational scheme is 
a viable pedagogical method for educators to follow. This study will 
attempt an evaluation of Quintilian's theory of rhetorical education. 
A review of Quintilian's predecessors will help to understand his 
major claim by way of contrast. Concerning these writers he says, 
". . . I was well aware that some of the most distinguished Greek and 
Roman writers had bequeathed to posterity a number of works dealing with 
h . b' .. 7 c· h d f ht ·) t is su Ject . . . i.e., t e stu yo re oric . Thus, his research 
began with Homer. 8 For the Athenians the poet, Homer, set forth the 
nature of the good man as being endowed with arete, . " i.e., ... that 
peculiar excellence that makes a thing, or a horse, or a soldier, or 
a hero, the best, the most effective, of their kind. 119 Homer had 
produced a transcendent ideal from which the Athenians had attempted 
2 
to construct the ideal man and society. Homer did not state that arete 
was a necessary condition for being a soldier or hero. 
From the sixth century to the fifth century a transition of leader-
ship took place in Athens, viz., from an aristocratic rule of those 
noble-born to the rule of a wealthy merchant class. At the same time, 
another significant change occurred in the thinking of the young men 
of Athens who chose not the life of subordination to the state but 
b 1 . d h 1. . 1 d 1 h . f 1. f lO e ieve t at p_o itica an persona power were t e true aims o i e. 
Because of this new emphasis a more realistic and practical approach to 
education was needed. Also, adding to the conflict, due to the 
political conditions in Athens, was the continued rise in population 
of those unprepared to fulfill their duties as public men. Therefore, 
they needed a quick and effective educational system which could produce 
public men. Since the Athenian teachers refused to participate in such 
a venture, the needs of these new students were met by the Sophists. 
These "professional teachers" claimed to teach their students how to 
gain political and personal power through rhetoric. This emphasis on 
11 personal success made the Sophists popular teachers. 
However, rhetoric, conceived as persuasive oratory, was not born 
in Athens. The earliest writers of rhetorical textbooks were the 
Sicilians, Corax and his student Tisias in the early part of the fifth 
century B.C. 12 Corax viewed rhetoric, in his Art of Rhetoric 
(c. 470 B.C.), as the artificer of persuasion which could be used by 
13 
citizens to plead their claims in the general assembly. Thus, his 
emphasis centered on the development of judicial rhetoric. To this 
end Corax and Tisias compiled handbooks of rhetorical precepts (designed 
3 
to aid judicial oratory). But, neither writer advocated the necessity 
of moral virtue as a prerequisite for judicial oratory. 
The influence of Corax and Tisias can be seen in Gorgias of Leotini 
who came from Sicily to Athens as an ambassador (c. 427 ·B.C.). Gorgias 
dazzled the Athenians with his speechmnking. His technique, which 
closely followed that of Corax, was to convince by words "the judges in 
court, the senators in Council, the people in the Assembly, or in any 
other gathering of a citizen body. 1114 The object, then, of his oratory 
was persuasion. 
Later, Isocrates (436 - 338 B.C.), a student of Gorgias, opened 
4 
his rhetorical school in Athens (c. 392 B.C.). Education, for Isocrates, 
meant education for political activity, i.e., for the purpose of life. 15 
He designed his school to ach1eve that purpose, viz., to train young men 
to be orators through the teaching of rhetoric. "Rhetoric," as viewed 
by Isocrates, " • . is of use in the practical affairs of everyday life 
and aids us when we deliberate concerning public affairs. 1116 However, 
Isocrates, in his rhetorical school, emphasized more than merely a 
technique of persuasion; his was a school where students developed 
17 
moral character. Thus, in the Panathenaicus, Isocrates says, ". I 
take more pleasure in those of my disciples who are distinguished for 
the character of their lives and deeds than in those who are reputed 
18 
to be able speakers." Hence, the primary object of instruction in 
the school of Isocrates was right conduct in the man and in the citizen. 
Though Isocrates stressed moral character, he did not make it a 
necessary condition for producing an orator. 
Another forerunner to Quintilian was Plato. Plato's ideas on 
rhetoric are developed in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus. In the Gorgias, 
5 
Plato analyzes the so-called "art of impressive speech" and concludes 
that Gorgias is merely able to persuade, rejecting the notion of such 
persuasion as teaching and therefore should not be a part of education 
for political life. 2° For Plato, the rhetoric of Gorgias was an activity 
that was not very reputable since it was a kind of routine built on 
trickery, deceit, immorality, and superficiality: a knack for giving 
21 pleasure. This idea of Plato is based on the admission of Gorgias 
that the art of rhetoric has to do only with words. 22 Hence,. Plato 
regarded such rhetoric as worthless. For Plato, the aim of life and 
education is the improvement of the soul; yet, this improvement only 
comes through the cultivation of intellect and righteousness. 23 Plato 
denies that "rhetoric" should be limited to mere speech-making, since 
the student should learn what is good and honest as well as what is 
24 beautiful and eloquent. Plato concludes that for one to be "a 
scientific practitioner of speech" he must know the truth about his 
b . d d. h f h . f h. d. 25 su Ject an iscover t e type o speec appropriate or is au ience. 
Plato, like Isocrates, does not list moral character as one of the 
necessary requirements for the orator. 
Where Plato saw traditional rhetoric as worthless, Aristotle, 
being somewhat practical himself, recognized the usefulness of rhetoric 
26 
as a tool. Again, unlike Plato, Aristotle was willing to compare 
rhetoric to dialectic, since both were within the field of knowledge of 
all men. The difference between the two, he pointed out, is not in 
nature but in subject and form. 27 Where dialectic is primarily 
philosophical, rhetoric is political, and, where dialectic consists of 
question and answer, rhetoric utilizes a prepared speech. Furthermore, 
since many subjects, which could be analyzed, are not capable of 
absolute demonstration, all men need the art of rhetoric. 28 Because of 
this belief, Aristotle was willing to teach rhetoric in the afternoon as 
a kind of supplementary subject. 29 However, his idea of the nature of 
rhetoric was somewhat different from the traditional view. He says: 
It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single 
definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; 
it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, 
that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but 
rather to discover the means.of coming as near such success as 
the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it 
resembles all other arts . . • Furthermore, it is plain that 
it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real 
and apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function 
of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism.30 
Aristotle then sets forth his formal definition of "rhetoric," which 
is: II . the faculty of observing in any given case the available 
f . 1131 means o persuasion. His definition places the most importance on 
invention, i.e., observing or discovering the various methods of 
persuasion. He then names various "means of persuasion," such as: 
32 laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and oaths. He states, however, 
6 
33 that the most effective mode of persuasion is the use of the Enthymeme. 
Finally, he turns his attention to another kind of persuasion, and says 
that " •.. character may almost be called the most effective means of 
persuasion . 1134 He stops short in declaring that good moral 
character is a necessary condition for becoming an orator. What 
Aristotle did was to join rhetoric and dialectical reasoning as 
faculties for providing arguments; and, both are needed to achieve 
. 35 persuasion. 
By the time of Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.) most of the Hellenistic 
rhetoricians stressed only the study of the rules of rhetoric. Since 
the majority of the schools offered rhetoric in the form of mere 
persuasion with little regard for knowledge, Cicero denounced them. 
Viewing such a situation he says, 
•.. we have lost so many good orators, how few there remain 
of any promise, fewer still of real ability, but too many 
whose presumption outweighs their skill. Now one cannot 
expect any but a chosen few to combine legal expertise with 
eloquence.36 
For Cicero, there was nothing more splendid than a complete orator; 
yet, this completeness depended on the acquisition of eloquence. 
Eloquence, then for Cicero, was significant and did exist but because 
it was so difficult to acquire, it could be reached only through mastery 
of philosophy. 37 Then and only then". • when one hears a real orator 
he believes what is said, thinks it true, assents and approves; the 
I d • . . ,,38 orator s wor s win conviction. But, to win conviction the orator 
must be first and foremost a sound thinker. 39 Armed with good reasoning 
powers the orator persuades his audience. Thus, Cicero viewed 
"rhetoric" as a means of persuasion; however, his claim was that 
" .. no man can be an orator complete in all points of merit, who 
has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts. 1140 
Cicero admits that he is perhaps portraying the orator who has never 
existed; the reason being that eloquence, being such a high and noble 
41 goal, is seldom reached. The difficulty, then, is that one must 
42 
acquire a broad knowledge of all important subjects, and be eloquent. 
Thus, to produce this doctus orator Cicero recommends a heavy emphasis 
upon literature, rhetoric, history, law, and philosophy because these 
areas constituted the basic intellectual guide for men. 43 
By Quintilian's day, "rhetoric" had been defined in various ways, 
viz., the power, practice, or science of persuading, which would 
7 
include Aristotle's disregard for results and his emphasis on invention. 44 
Quintilian points out that there are many other things which have the 
"power of persuasion," e.g., money, influence, or even the authority 
45 
and rank of the speaker. He then concludes, "And if all these have 
power to persuade, the end of oratory, which we are discussing, cannot 
adequately be defined as persuasion. 1146 As for Aristotle's definition, 
two faults are pointed out: first, others besides orators persuade by 
speaking, and there is " the additional defect of including merely 
the power of invention, which without style cannot possibly constitute 
47 
oratory." 
Plato, though condemning rhetoric as it was practiced in his day, 
held that true rhetoric is impossible for any save one who knows the 
truth of his subject. 48 This view of rhetoric is much closer to that 
held by Quintilian, since both agreed that speaking in a persuasive 
manner was too inclusive, i.e., even bad men could develop the power 
of persuasion. For Quintilian, 
The definition which best suits its real character is that 
which makes rhetoric the science of speaking well. For this 
definition includes all the virtues of oratory and the 
character of the orator as well, since no man can speak 
well who is not good himself.49 
If "rhetoric" is the science of speaking well, the development of moral 
character would be a necessary condition for producing the orator. 
And bad mert would not be called orators because they would not possess 
moral character which Quintilian identifies as a requirement for 
. so 
eloquence. Thus, Quintilian's predecessors would recommend that 
the orator must know the truth of his subject matter, be persuasive 
in his speech, and have a broad knowledge of all important subjects. 
However, only Quintilian argues that for one to be an orator he must 
51 be a good man. 
8 
9 
Previous Work on This Topic 
Though many ab-le writers have contributed to the understanding of 
Quintilian's educational philosophy, very few have attempted to explain 
or analyze his major claim, i.e., that the development of moral character 
is a prerequisite for all other learning. However, there are writers 
who have expounded or inferred the importance of excellence, or moral 
h . . . h B . 52 h 53 ll 54 c aracter, in communication, sue as: r1gance, Murp y, Wa ace, 
Oliver, 55 Brembeck and Howell, 56 and Haiman. 57 Two writers in particular 
who believe in the "good man" theory are Campbel1 58 and Blair. 59 
Campbell shows his preference for the "good man" theory when he states: 
Sympathy in the hearers to the speaker may be lessened 
several ways, chiefly by these two; by a low opinion of 
his intellectual abilities, and by a bad opinion of his 
morals. The latter is the more prejudicial of the two.60 
Further on he says: 
for promoting the success of the orator, (whatever 
be the kind of public speaking in which he is concerned), 
it is a matter of some consequence that, in the opinion of 61 
those whom he addresseth, he is both a wise and a good man. 
Blairs convictions are similar to those of Campbell and both are 
strong supporters of Quintilian. Blair contends that " ..• what 
stands highest in the order of means, is personal character and 
disposition . . In order to be a truly eloquent or persuasive speaker, 
nothing is more necessary than to be a virtuous man. 1162 He adds: 
Whereas, if we entertain a suspicion of craft and disin-
genuity, of a corrupt, or a base mind, in the speaker, his 
eloquence loses all its real effect. It may entertain and 
amuse; but it is viewed as artifice, as trick, as the 
play only of speech; and viewed in this light, whom can 
it persuade?63 
10 
Though Campbell and Blair stress that speakers should have high moral 
character and personal integrity, neither attempts an exegesis of 
Quintilian's hypothesis. 
Literature which describes the influence and characteristics of 
moral education abounds. A list of the more important writers who 
describe, identify, report, or evaluate moral education in public and 
h 1 1 d 64 65 66 . 6 7 . h 68 private sc oo s inc u es: Kay, Barrow, Lerner, Hirst, For1s a, 
69 70 71 Fraenkel, Purpel and Ryan, and Simon and Kirschenbaum, to name 
only a few. These writers agree that reasoning about moral issues is 
of prodigious importance, and their extended research and analysis 
would tend to prove it. However, they do not explain how one develops 
moral virtue in his own character. Further, the leading contemporary 
advocate of the development of moral reasoning in students of the public 
schools is Professor Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard University. Kohlberg's 
theory attempts to explore the nature of morality and to develop more 
adequate modes of moral reasoning. 72 His theory, the cognitive-
developmental theory of moralization, is more properly a "description" 
of the development of moral judgment in students. In fact, his main 
concern seems to be how moral judgment operates in people's lives. 73 
Kohlberg, Kay, Barrow, and the rest either attempt to identify moral 
issues and test students to ascertain the development of their moral 
reasoning capabilities, or they describe the influence that moral 
education has or could have on public education. Their findings are 
somewhat summarized by Kohlberg when he says: 
The most common system of moral education in America is 
neither 'character education,' 'values clarification,' 
nor a cognitive-developmental just community approach, 74 
but no conscious system at all, the hidden curriculum. 
11 
Finally, these writers, as stated above, research the moral atmosphere 
of various public and private schools and report student reaction to 
diverse moral issues such as civil rights, punishment, the value of life, 
truth, etc. They neither agree with nor deny the claim of Quintilian. 
Three writers were discovered who challenge Quintilian's claim, 
viz., Whately, 75 Goodrich, 76 and Adams. 77 First, though he makes clear 
that he is discussing the impression produced in the minds of the hearers 
rather than the qualities of the speaker, Whately briefly attacks the 
position of Quintilian. For Whately, "rhetoric" is 
. the art of reasonsed discourse, as governing that sort 
of composition in which conclusions are inferred from 
premises according to the laws of logic . • . and more 
precisely, it is to be viewed as the art of argumentative 
composition generally and exclusively.78 
What follows next is Whately's major criticism of Quintilian's claim. 
So judicious.an author as Quintilian would not have failed 
to perceive, had he not been carried away by an inordinate 
veneration for his own art, that as the possession of 
building materials is not part of the art of Architecture, 
though it is impossible to build without materials, so, the 
knowledge of the subjects on which the orator is to speak, 
constitutes no part of the art of Rhetoric, though it be 
essential to its successful employment; and that though 
virtue, and the good reputation it procures, add materially 
to the speaker's influence, they are no more to be, for 
that reason considered as belonging to the orator, as such, 
than wealth, rank, or a good person, which manifestly have 
a tendency to produce the same effect.79 
This statement from Whately's Elements of Rhetoric is the extent of 
his concern for the "good man" theory of Quintilian. Whately does 
not agree with Quintilian's definition that "rhetoric" is the science 
of speaking well, and therein lies the problem. 
Goodrich claims that the most important element in rhetoric is 
eloquence. However, the eloquence he speaks of consists of one's 
. 1 f 1 . d . h . b . 80 ernotiona ee ings regar ing is su Ject matter. Since what is 
important is to speak from strong emotions he says, "A man's character 
may be bad, and yet his cause a good one, so that we can justly feel 
81 
with him in the strong emotions which he feels." He concludes, 
" . virtue is certainly not necessary to eloquence, though it is 
favorable to its most perfect exercise. 1182 Goodrich had separated 
eloquence from good character, thus completely denying the claim of 
Quintilian. 
The most serious accusation against the theory of Quintilian is 
raised by Adams. The difficulty, Adams declares, is that Quintilian 
has set out to form the orator who possesses moral perfection. 
12 
" ... if it be meant," Adams says, "that no man can be eloquent without 
being virtuous, the assertion is alike contradicted by the general 
constitution of human nature, and by the whole tenor of human 
experience. 1183 Thus, man is incapable of acquiring moral perfection 
because this quality " is incompatible with the uniform constitution 
84 
of human nature." However, Adams asserts that bad men have been 
85 
eminently gifted with oratory, yet none have achieved a state of 
moral perfection. 
A second objection by Adams is directed against Quintilian's 
so-called "honest man." He states: 
An orator, says he, must be an honest man to enable him, 
whenever it may be necessary for the success of his cause, 
to impose upon the minds of his auditors falsehood for truth. 
And then follows a philosophical disquisition of the 
occasions, when an honest man may lie, for the good of his 
client . . . He insists, that his orator must be an honest 
man. But he allows his honest man to equivocate and lie, 
and abuse the confidence, acquired by honesty, to promote 
the success of the fraud.86 
This is indeed a serious charge against the major position of Quintilian. 
If Quintilian's orator must be a good and honest man, why would he 
permit him to lie? The conclusion that Adams draws is that the ability 
to speak well, which he calls eloquence, can only be the privilege of 
a few, and this ability can be demonstrated by men devoid of virtue. 87 
Proposed Methodology of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to critically appraise Quintilian's 
theory of rhetorical education. Chapter I presents the statement of 
the problem and how certain writers have reacted to Quintilian's claim. 
Chapter II is a critical study of the nature of rhetoric reflected 
in the educational writings of Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. 
This chapter will also explicate their major tenets regarding the role 
that moral virtue plays in the development of an orator. 
Chapter III will attempt to delineate Quintilian's formation of 
the ideal orator. The topics of importance are: (1) his views of the 
nature of rhetoric; (2) the characteristics of the ideal teacher; and 
(3) how the teaching of moral virtue is to be accomplished. 
Chapter IV will present Quintilian's evaluation of Greek and 
early Roman rhetorical education. The major topics are: (1) the 
Greek educational legacy and (2) the early Roman educational legacy. 
Chapter V will attempt an appraisal of Quintilian's rhetorical 
education. The topics discussed will include: (1) an evaluation of 
Quintilian's view of rhetorical education and (2) appropriate conclu-
sions and recommendations resulting from the study. 
13 
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CHAPTER II 
RHETORIC AS VIEWED BY QUINTILIAN'S PREDECESSORS 
Much has been written regarding the importance of rhetorical 
education. In this chapter the rhetorical concepts of Isocrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, and Cicero will be presented. The purposes of this chapter 
are: (1) to show how Quintilian's predecessors viewed the role of 
rhetoric in their educational theories and (2) to demonstrate the 
similar rhetorical concepts held by the group. 
The ancient Greek society gave no little accord to oratorical 
expression. The epic poems of Homer (the Iliad and the Odyssey) provided 
a primitive model for the advancement of eloquence. Thus long before a 
system of speechcraft had been developed, speakers like Achilles and 
Nestor were able to secure certain responses from their hearers. It 
is only natural that a systematic art of speaking would be developed. 
Therefore the Sicilians, Corax and his student Tisias, attempted to 
write the first rhetorical textbooks aiding judicial oratory. 1 A 
second influence, greater than the first, was the encouragement of 
public speaking due to the Athenian form of government. In the Popular 
Assembly, "Every man was his own pleader; consequently, each case 
provided a natural stimulus to effective oratorical presentation." 2 
Finally, the Greeks began to examine the nature of education, i.e., how 
should men and children be educated? At first, a practical approach to 
education was attempted, viz., one that stressed service to the city; 
19 
20 
however, by 450 B.C. the young men of Athens desired political power, 
wealth, and personal advancement. They simply desired a quick and 
abbreviated program of studies. Thus the eristic Sophists provided a 
narrow training in rhetoric that was designed to make men successful in 
politics. The students were trained to employ words as weapons in the 
law courts while using devious tactical tricks to win fame and fortune. 
Rhetoric, so conceived, flourished throughout the Athenian empire. 
Isocrates 
The first important forerunner to Quintilian to advance a contrasting 
view of rhetoric, rather than that held by the Sophists, was Isocrates. 
This son of Theodorus (a flute maker) composed a number of speeches, 
yet he never appeared as a public speaker (or pleader). He claimed his 
speaking tools were extremely weak, i.e., a lack of voice and extreme 
3 
nervousness. Since he thought he was unfitted for the role of orator 
He endeavoured to direct the affairs of Athens and of Greece 
without ever holding an office, and to mould public 
opinion without ever addressing a public assembly, by 
issuing from his study political pamphlets, or essays in 
oratorical form, in which he set forth the proper conduct of 
the Greeks in the light of broad ideas.4 
So, the career of Isocrates the writer and teacher began with the 
opening of his rhetorical school in Athens (c. 392 B.C.). His educa-
tional plan laid great emphasis on the study of the literary classics; 
but his major purpose was to train orators through the teaching of 
rhetoric. 
Isocrates, unlike the Sophists of his day, viewed the teaching of 
rhetoric not merely as a technique of persuasion, but as encompassing 
the development of moral character. This belief he attributed to one 
of his teachers, Socrates. 5 To this end Isocrates attempted to shun 
21 
the rhetorical teachings of the eristic Sophists while he introduced the 
idea that statesmanship can be linked to oratorical ability. First, he 
condemned the teachers of rhetoric who placed great emphasis upon mere 
techniques, i.e., relying on striking words and phrases as did Gorgias 
of Leontini. Isocrates demanded logical clearness and the proper 
definition of terms. Next, Isocrates addressed a more pressing problem--
that is speculative philosophy. In the A.ntiodosis he says, " ... I hold 
that men who want to do some good in the world must banish utterly from 
their interests all vain speculations and all activities which have no 
bearing on our lives. 116 Thus, he denied the pursuit of speculative 
philosophy in his school so that he could direct his instruction to the 
training of those students who desire the good and not the evil things 
of life. 7 Such instruction, according to Isocrates, would improve 
both the individual and the state. The aim of his rhetorical school 
then was to teach his students the ability to discuss suhjects of 
permanent interest, viz., the production of a good man, acquiring moral 
. . . d d . 8 virtue, piety, Justice, an mo eration. That Isocrates desired to 
promote moral virtue in his students is most obvious from the following 
selections. He says in To Demonicus, " ... I deem it fitting that 
those who strive for distinction and are ambitious for education 
should emulate the good and not the bad. Further, ". . . I am 
going to counsel you on the objects to which young men should aspire 
and with what sort of men they should associate and how they should 
regulate their own lives. 111° Finally, "With these examples before you, 
you should aspire to nobility of character, and not only abide by what 
I have said, but acquaint yourself with the best things in the poets 
as well, and learn from the other wise men also any useful lessons 
11 
they have taught." In short, Isocrates directs the young men of his 
school to strive for distinction, abstain from bad actions, develop the 
soul, show devotion to the gods, treat parents with honor and respect, 
12 
and resolve to be men of taste. It seems obvious that in the 
rhetorical school of Isocrates the acquisition of moral virtue was 
more important than the ability or power to persuade. Perhaps the 
reason for the emphasis upon moral virtue is given by Isocrates in 
On The Peace: "I marvel that you cannot see at once that no class is 
13 
so inimical to the people as our depraved orators and demogogues." 
Thus the art of rhetoric for Isocrates offered not only a method of 
h . h d . b f l "f 14 ig er e ucation ut a way o i e. 
A third important aspect of the teachings of Isocrates reveals his 
concern for the gleaning of true knowledge. He had condemned those who 
taught that the art of oratory could be acquired by anyone by rote 
regardless of his natural ability or practical experience. True 
knowledge, he insisted, would require strict discipline; otherwise 
the end result is that 
. . . they are themselves so stupid and conceive others to be 
so dull that, although the speeches which they compose are 
worse than those which some laymen improvise, nevertheless 
they promise to make their students such clever orators that 
they will not overlook any of the possibilities which a 
subject affords.15 
Therefore to produce an orator of native ability and practical experi-
ence is essential. Formal training is good but " ... it cannot fully 
fashion men who are without natural aptitude into good debaters or 
writers 1116 Further, he says that much study is needed, coupled 
• h II • d • • . • d 1117 wit a vigorous an imaginative min . However, one cannot reach 
this high goal (true knowledge) apart from philosophy. "It follows, 
22 
then, that the power to speak well and think right will reward the man 
who approaches the art of discourse with love of wisdom and love of 
18 honour." 
From what has been said a few conclusions can be drawn. First, 
Isocrates stresses the importance of acquiring moral virtue; yet in 
the Antiodosis he states, " ... let no one suppose that I claim that 
just living can be taught; for, in a word, I hold that there does not 
exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in 
19 depraved natures." Isocrates probably means that such "just living" 
cannot be taught merely by words; he does not say. The implication is 
that the development of good character belongs to the man who acts 
accordingly and that the development of such excellence involves native 
ability and the practice of right action. 
Next, Isocrates was attempting to make men--not training men to 
make things; therefore, he used the study of the classical authors as 
a foundation for the higher study of rhetoric and philosophy. Thus, he 
23 
linked the ideal of the cultivated mind with the training of the orator. 
A final significant conclusion suggests that while Isocrates did 
in fact stress the acquisition of a good moral character and that 
properly trained orators would enhance any state, he never, in any of 
his writings, stated that the former is a necessary condition for 
producing the latter. As a matter of fact, Isocrates believed that 
having a good moral character was superior to.oratorical excellence. 
He states in the Antiodosis that he took greater pleasure in his 
students for their good character than in their ability to speak well. 20 
As a pioneer in refining the techniques for oratorical expression 
while building strong character in his students, Isocrates emerged as 
a professional writer and Athenian educator. Even Socrates prophesied 
his tremendous influence by saying, 
It seems to me that his natural powers give him a superiority 
over anything that Lysias has achieved in literature, and 
also that in point of character he is of a nobler composition; 
hence it would not surprise me if with advancing years he made 
all his literary predecessors look like very small-fry--that 
is, supposing him to persist in the actual type of writing in 
which he engages at present--still more so, if he should become 
dissatisfied with such work, and a sublimer impulse lead him 
to do greater things. For that mind of his, Phaedrus, 
contains an innate tincture of philosophy.21 
The primary objective of the school of Isocrates then was the 
production of responsible public men and effective orators, i.e., 
civic efficiency through rhetoric. 
Plato 
24 
Another precursor to Quintilian, though, viewed the role and purpose 
of rhetoric in a much harsher light. The teachers of rhetoric, according 
to Plato, were charlatans whose discourse was continually fallacious. 22 
Thus he condemned the so-called art of rhetoric that was offered to the 
young men of Athens. His reasons for the condemnation are numerous, 
including: 23 their practice of charging fees, their reliance on mere 
24 
opinion rather than philosophic knowledge, and their speaking and 
25 
writing in a bad and shameful way by extolling evil as being good. 
The Platonic conception of rhetoric is set forth in two of Plato's 
major dialogues: the Gorgias and the Phaedrus. What Plato attempted to 
prove was that rhetoricians who taught like Gorgias 26 were indeed false 
teachers, whereas good speaking derives from a speaker who knows the 
truth of the subject on which he is about to speak. That is, the 
orator must know the truth in order to be persuasive. Therefore it is 
crucial to understand the distinction between true and false rhetoric. 
25 
Thus, as the dialogues (Gorgias and Phaedrus) unfold, Plato insists that 
the true rhetorician must comply with the following standards: ( 1) he 
must define all terms adequately; 27 (2) he must possess the knowledge of 
28 
which subjects are debatable and which are not; (3) he must move from 
a concern with the material world to a concern for the world of ideas; 29 
(4) he must understand that any discourse ought to be structured like a 
living creature, i.e., he must understand how to arrange the parts of 
30 31 the speech; (5) he must know the nature of the soul; (6) he must have 
a thoro.ugh knowledge of style and delivery ; 32 and (7) he must know the 
33 truth regarding his subject if he is to expound or persuade. From 
Plato's point of view such a rhetorician would be a philosopher and 
34 
would know and speak what was pleasing to the gods. So viewed, 
rhetoric would not be an instrument merely for persuasion, but rather 
for the cultivation of intellect and righteousness. 
A problem still exists. Both Plato and the Sohpists debated the 
possibility of teaching virtue. Judging from the Gorgias, the Sophist 
position was that virtue can be produced in the student by direct 
teaching--at least that was their claim. 35 Protagoras also strongly 
insisted " ..• that virtue can be instilled by education .. .. 36 The 
teaching technique is to punish the wrongdoer so that in the future he 
·11 . . 37 wi act in a more virtuous way. In that same dialogue, Protagoras 
Socrates simply says, " . . I do not believe that virtue can be 
38 taught." The implication is that Socrates had not discovered or did 
not know what virtue was and therefore could not teach it. However, 
at the end of the Meno he suggests that " ... whoever has virtue gets 
i.t b d" · d. · 1139 y ivine ispensation. Isocrates also believed that virtue was 
a natural endowment and as such was not subject to any pedagogical 
. 40 technique. 
26 
Thus, for Plato, knowledge must come first and then rhetoric with 
all of its rules and skills that must be mastered; and no one should 
be led to believe there is an easy or clear path to oratorical excel-
41 lence. So, where Isocrates stressed the importance of acquiring moral 
virtue, Plato emphasized the value of attaining knowledge. If anything, 
Plato attempted to prove that knowledge was a necessary condition for 
becoming an orator. 
Aristotle 
According to Thonssen, " ..• Aristotle is perhaps the most highly 
d f . . . h . ,,42 esteeme igure in ancient r etoric. The reason for this honor does 
not seem to lie in the number of orators produced by the school of 
Aristotle since only one orator of note was produced--Demetrius 
43 Phalereus. Rather, the honor stems from Aristotle's scientific 
presentation of the topic of rhetoric. Therefore Aristotle's Rhetoric 
is somewhat detached from both morality and pedagogy. It is simply a 
scientific analysis of the means of persuasion. That is what makes 
his idea of the nature of rhetoric different from the traditional view. 
To Aristotle, rhetoric is not limited in subject matter, it is useful, 
and its function is the power to observe any and all of the various 
f . 44 means o persuasion. It follows that Aristotle would define "rhetoric" 
as " . the faculty of observing in any given case the available means 
f . .,45 o persuasion. Rhetoric so conceived is neither a manual of rules 
nor a collection of injunctions. And that is why Aristotle says of 
rhetoric that " ... in its technical character, it is not concerned 
with any special or definite class of subjects. 1146 
27 
The first task for Aristotle in his Rhetoric, then, was to define 
his notion of rhetoric. Next, he pointed out the various modes of 
persuasion and says there are three kinds. "The first kind depends on 
the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the 
audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or 
apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself . 1147 Thus the 
orator may persuade with his own personal character or organize his 
speech so as to stir the emotions of his audience, or he may convince 
the audience by using logical, persuasive arguments. Aristotle's 
emphasis is upon invention and disposition, i.e., knowing what to say 
and how to arrange the speech so as to secure the greatest persuasion. 
The use of memory is not a vital part of the Aristotelian rhetoric. 
However, elocution (the matter of style) and delivery are to Aristotle 
. . . . d d. . . 48 Just as important as invention an isposition. 
The role of rhetoric as conceived by Aristotle must achieve some 
purpose since " • every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some 
49 good." Rhetoric must fulfill the purpose for which it was designed, 
viz., the power to persuade. That is why Aristotle spends much of his 
time discussing how that power is put to use. For example, 
The most important and effective qualification for success 
is persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs 
is to understand all the forms of government and to 
discriminate their respective customs, institutions and 
interests.SO 
The persuader must know the various kinds of government so that he can 
ld h . . f. h f f h 1. d 51 mo t e citizen to it w atever orm o government e ives un er. 
Next, the orator may persuade or convince his audience as (1) a 
political speaker urging acceptance or rejection regarding a particular 
action; (2) a speaker in a forensic way, either attacking or defending 
somebody; or (3) heaping praise or censure on one as a ceremonial 
52 
speaker. Another way rhetoric fulfills its purpose is the strong 
persuasion that results from the orator's own character. Of the many 
remarks made by Aristotle regarding this point the following seems 
most appropriate. 
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character 
when the speech is so spoken as to make him credible. We 
believe good men more fully and more readily than others: 
this is true generally whatever the question is, and 
absolutely where exact certainty is impossible and 
opinions are divided.53 
Later on in the Rhetoric he says, "There are three things which inspire 
confidence in the orator's own character--the three, namely, that 
induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, 
good moral character, and goodwill. 1154 The point that Aristotle is 
making is that the " ... use of persuasive speech is to lead to 
d . . 1155 ecisions. Aristotle is simply showing his preference for speaking 
in the law courts or during political debates, since in both cases 
issues arise and decisions must be rendered. Thus, to help the orator 
discover material for use during such discussions Aristotle introduced 
the "topics", i.e., a storehouse that one could resort to in order to 
discover how and what to say on any given subject. Specifically, 
" . . a topic was a general head or line of argument which suggested 
56 
material from which proofs could be made." One of the common topics, 
he says, used by all orators is the possible and impossible, e.g., if 
it is possible for doss to be fast runners then the contrary would 
demonstrate the impossibility. Next, orators could use the topic of 
the question of past fact," i..e., " ... if the less likely of two 
things has occurred, the more likely must have occurred also. 1157 And 
28 
29 
" .. if a man has forgotten a thing, he has also once learnt it. 1158 
Finally, the orator can glean material for arguments by examining the 
greatness or smallness of things, i.e., the topic of size. 
The rhetoric of Aristotle, as shown, is encased in the use o[ 
argumentation and the demonstration of moral character is to enhance 
the persuasiveness of the orator. And, like Plato, Aristotle emphasized 
the need for the orator to gain knowledge so that he could discuss his 
subjects intelligently. He warns, 
The first thing we have to remember is this. Whether our 
argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we 
must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject 
on which we are to speak and argue. Otherwise we can have 
no materials out of which to construct arguments.59 
The orator then must know the facts of his subject, develop the available 
60 
means for persuasion, decide the correct style to use and arrange the 
various parts of the speech in the most logical fashion. 
Thus far Aristotle has continually treated the role of moral virtue 
as part of the available means to secure persuasion; intellectual 
virtue, however, he treats as a necessary condition for speaking 
effectively. For without intellectual virtue (knowledge gained by and 
h h h . ) h . . f h. b. 61 t roug teac ing t e orator remains ignorant o is su Ject. However, 
Aristotle's treatment of the acquisition of moral virtue is drastically 
different from that of Isocrates or Plato. First, Aristotle believes 
that II • moral virtue comes about as a result of !:1abit .. 1162 
That is, moral virtue is not given to man by the gods, nor is it acquired 
through man's nature. Rather, men become morally excellent by parti-
cipating in right action. Just as " men become builders by 
building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just 
by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing 
30 
63 brave acts." If one is to have strong moral character he must not only 
engage in virtuous acts, according to Aristotle, he must also ". be 
in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have 
knowledge, second he must choose the acts, and choose them for their 
own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchange-
64 
able character." Moral virtue, then, is a state of character arrived 
at by making correct choices, i.e., each choice is a mean between two 
65 
extremes. Aristotle was not referring to an absolute mean but a 
relative one; 66 therefore, " . it is a mean between two vices, the 
1 . h h d f . 116 7 one invo ving excess, t e ot er e iciency . . • Is moral virtue 
a necessary condition for becoming an orator? Aristotle's answer 
suggests that only intellectual virtue is necessary for becoming an 
orator and moral virtue is but a part of the available means the orator 
uses to secure persuasion. This Aristotelian notion of rhetoric figures 
preeminently in Greek society and laid the foundation for the more 
pragmatic development of rhetoric by the Romans. 
Cicero 
From the founding of the Roman Republic (c. 509 B.C.) education, 
controlled and dominated by the family, emphasized the Roman virtues 
68 
of piety, courage, and prudence. Most, if not all of these early 
schools, were designed for wealthy families. Of note is the fact that 
teachers of these private schools stressed grammatical structure far 
more than oratorical excellence. In time the study of both Greek and 
Latin grammar gave way to the teaching of persuasive discourse, i.e., 
the goal of the schools was the production of eloquent citizens. 
31 
By the first century B.C. the most gifted of the eloquent citizens 
was Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.). Grant, the historian, describes this power-
ful orator by stating: 
Cicero owed his rise almost exclusively to one single quality. 
He was one of the most persuasive orators who has ever lived, 
in an age in which the very core of politics was oratory. The 
combination of his inborn talents with an elaborate education 
and training equipped him to speak and write that incomparably 
eloquent, rotund Latin that persuaded and overwhelmed his 
audience in Senate, Assembly, and lawcourts alike, and laid 
the foundations of the subsequent prose of all Europe. His 
speeches, of which 58 out of over a hundred survive, reflect 
all the stresses and strains of the crumbling republic, in 
which for three decades he lived and worked at the center of 
events.69 
So, we normally think of Cicero as a lawyer, politician, philosopher 
and the greatest of the Roman orators. Yet, guided by the teachings 
of Isocrates, whom Cicero regarded as the "father of eloquence," he 
made a significant contribution to rhetorical theory by writing 
70 De Oratore. In this famous work a discussion takes place between 
Crassus (mouthpiece of Cicero) and the practical Antonius. Crassus 
attempts to describe the orator of their quest by saying, " ... since 
it is 'the orator' we are seeking, we have to picture to ourselves in 
our discourse an orator from whom every blemish has been taken away, 
and one who moreover is rich in every merit. 1171 However, in the Orator 
Cicero insists that he was portraying " . such a one as perhaps has 
never existed. 1172 Yet, one of the goals of Ciceronian rhetoric was the 
picturing of the- ideal orator. "This ideal," however, "cannot be 
perceived by the eye or ear, nor by any of the senses, but we can 
h 1 . b h . d d h . . . If 73 nevert e ess grasp it y t e min an t e imagination. Cicero tried 
to envision the "ideal orator," and his writings reflect the purpose, 
design, and character of such a one. 
32 
Of prodigious importance to Cicero is the fact that " ... no man 
can be an orator complete in all points of merit, who has not attained 
a knowledge of all important subjects and arts. 1174 Otherwise, he says, 
" .•. oratory is but an empty and ridiculous swirl of verbiage . "75 
Cicero, like Aristotle, emphasized the necessity of persuasion because 
the duty of the orator is to arouse his hearers, win their favor, and 
h k d . . 76 cause t em to ma e ecisions. Thus a thorough knowledge of his subject 
matter makes the orator more forceful in his persuasion. And, the 
orator cannot achieve such persuasion without an effective delivery. 77 
Obviously, Cicero did not believe that just anyone could combine know-
ledge of various topics with the techniques of eloquence. In fact the 
whole life of the orator was open for investigation. How could one 
persuade with a weak and uninformed mind? What lasting glory can be 
attained by vain show and pretense? And finally, "Moral greatness and 
contempt for worldly things are, as I am constantly stressing, just as 
essential for the statesman as for the philosopher--perhaps even more 
essential. 1178 As strong as Cicero's position is regarding the attain-
ment of moral virtue, he stops short in declaring it a necessary 
condition for becoming an orator. Cicero merely urges the cultivation 
of moral excellence since it can be acquired by engaging in the proper 
d . 79 . stu ies, i.e., like Aristotle, Cicero advocates that one acquires 
1 11 b . . . 80 mora exce ence y engaging in virtuous acts. In conclusions, it is 
more important to Cicero for the orator to persuade his audience through 
his style of speaking (eloquence) coupled with knowledge of his topic 
than to spend much time in acquiring moral excellence. In this respect 
Cicero's teaching of rhetoric emphasized the functional aspects of the 
art, viz., the acquisition of exact knowledge, the ability of arouse 
33 
emotions and to possess true eloquence. In fact, it is the latter that 
Cicero deems most important; for the orator must convince his hearers 
so that they approve his proposals. According to Cicero, it is the 
I d h . . . 81 orator s wor s t at win conviction. Thus to the end, the practical 
nature of rhetoric is stressed. 
This review of Quintilian's predecessors (Isocrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, and Cicero) discloses the following: (1) Isocrates viewed 
the teaching of rhetoric as a means to produce responsible public men 
who could argue well in the lawcourts; (2) Plato, while denouncing the 
rhetorical teachers of his day, insisted that the path to oratorical 
excellence depended more on the acquisition of knowledge than on flowery 
speech; (3) for Aristotle, rhetoric involves the discovery of all the 
available means for securing persuasion, and the greatest means to that 
end is the display of intellectual virtue; and (4) Cicero saw rhetoric 
as the practical application of persuasion, i.e., if one is to win 
cases and direct the state, he must use persuasive speech. 
These writers, for the most part, saw rhetoric as a tool to secure 
persuasion. None of them advanced the idea that the attainment of 
moral virtue was a necessary condition for becoming an orator. On the 
contrary, they demanded of the orator exact knowledge of all topics 
discussed and a display of eloquence. Then and only then could the 
orator be persuasive. 
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CHAPTER III 
QUINTILIAN'S FORMATION OF THE IDEAL ORATOR 
Quintilian leaves little doubt as to the purpose of his writing 
the Institutes of Oratory. His goal was " ..• the education of the 
1 perfect orator." However the work was originally intended as a 
pedagogical guide for his own son and Geta, the son of Marcellus 
V . . 2 ictorius. Even Domitianus Augustus had requested the expertise 
of Quintilian in the training of his sister's grandsons. 
This chapter will attempt to delineate Quintilian's formation of 
the ideal orator. The topics discussed will include: ( 1) his views 
of the nature of rhetoric; (2) the characteristic of the ideal teacher; 
and (3) how the teaching of moral virtue is to be accomplished. 
The Nature of Rhetoric 
The predecessors of Quintilian (Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and 
Cicero) had defined "rhetoric" as the power, practice or science of 
persuading. Quintilian viewed this definition as totally inadequate 
because such things as money, influence, authority and rank, great 
3 deeds, appearance, beauty and pity have power to persuade. Thus 
Quintilian defined "rhetoric" as bene dicendi scientia, i.e., the art 
4 
or science of expressing oneself well. For one to speak well means 
more than just what is grammatically correct; he must understand the 
nature of rhetoric. 
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Quintilian examines first the five parts of rhetoric, viz., 
invention, arrangement, expression, memory and delivery. Invention is 
the gathering of material on which the orator will speak. He should 
pay close attention to factual detail realizing that his audience will 
respond more favorably to a presentation that includes specific 
informational content. Further, after gleaning exact knowledge, he must 
discover arguments that will convince his audience that his conclusions 
are correct. A second part of rhetoric is arrangement. Here the orator 
decides which information or arguments should be presented. Information 
that is not precise is discarded along with those arguments that are 
fallacious. What remains--distinct facts and persuasive arguments--is 
organized into an outline of the discourse. Such a procedure insures 
that what the orator says will be presented in the most enlightening 
and logical fashion. "For not only what we say and how we say it is of 
importance, but also the circumstances under which we say it. 115 Thus 
the need to arrange ideas and arguments in the most clear and distinct 
fashion is of prodigious importance. Next, expression or elocution is 
a question of style, namely the wording of what is to be asserted. 
Here Quintilian, confessing that style presents the greatest difficulty 
for the speaker to master, says 
... it is this which is the chief object of our study, 
the goal of all our exercises and all our efforts at 
imitation, and it is to this that we devote the energies of 
a lifetime; it is this that makes one orator surpass his 
rivals, this that makes one style of speaking preferable 
to another.6 
To begin, Quintilian regards clearness as the first essential of a 
7 good style. What he means is that for the orator to speak clearly 
he must use intelligible words and phrases that his audience will 
understand and avoid all meaningless phrases that are intelligible 
40 
only to himself. He therefore must shun language that is obscure, such 
as the use of words which are familiar in certain districts though not in 
others and sentences that are so long that it is impossible to follow 
their drift. Clearness of thought can also be defeated by introducing 
useless words, as for example the use of a multitude of words to explain 
a simple idea. Rather what is needed is a direct and simple statement 
of the facts. However, Quintilian warns that orators must not be 
" consumed with a passion for brevity and omit words which are 
actually necessary to the sense .•• 118 The orator must use language 
that is not less nor more than is required so that " • the whole 
matter will be plain and obvious even to a not too attentive audience." 9 
The fourth part of rhetoric, according to Quintilian, is memory. 
He treats memory as the treasure-house of eloquence because he believes 
that 
... our whole education depends upon memory, and we shall 
receive instruction all in vain if all we hear slips from us, 
while it is the power of memory alone that brings before us 
all the store of precedents, laws, rulings, sayings, and 
facts which the orator must possess in abundance and which 
he must always hold ready for immediate use.10 
So while invention (the gathering of material), arrangement (putting 
order into what has been discovered) and expression (the wording of 
what is to be asserted) are importnat, it is the use of memory that 
enables the orator to sustain the forward flow of his speech. Without 
a good memory the orator's language is ~alting and jerky causing 
k d h . . . d ·1 11 aw war esitations or even a tongue-tie si ence. To avoid these 
interruptions in speaking Quintilian offers the following recommenda-
tions. First, though memory to a great extent may be one of nature's 
gifts, he believes that memory may be improved by cultivation. That is, 
h . h d f . . . d . d 12 if t ere is one supreme met o o memory it is practice an in ustry. 
The orator must daily learn by heart as much as he can because 
" •. there is nothing that is more increased by practice or impaired 
13 by neglect than memory." Next, memory can be enhanced by using 
certain mnemonic methods. One device would be to divide the speech 
into sections and then memorize each section separately. Another 
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method would be the use of localities (public buildings, a long journey, 
parts of a city or pictures) so that when the orator recalls the place 
or event he will remember perhaps better the people who were there 
and what was said. Still another way would be the employment of 
symbols to jog the memory. As examples Quintilian uses symbols drawn 
from nagivation like an anchor or from warfare by referring to a 
particular weapon. Thus the association of one idea triggers another 
just like the simple device of changing a ring from one finger to 
h f · · d f. 14 I h h d anot er or o tying a string aroun a inger. n s ort, any met o 
that aids the power of recollection becomes a useful tool to enhance 
the orator's memory. 
The final part of rhetoric is what Quintilian calls delivery or 
action. Thus the visual presentation of a speech should match the 
vocal endeavor of the orator. So delivery is concerned with both 
voice and gesture. To begin, the orator though not bound by any 
special garb should dress in a distinguished and manly fashion, i.e., 
he should desire to wear the appropriate outer garment, suitable shoes, 
and use an acceptable hair arrangement. 15 Now his initial impact on 
the audience will be one of poise, confidence and effectiveness. 
Visually the orator can now project the kind of enthusiasm that will 
arouse the audience before he speaks. Quintilian then addresses the 
major parts of delivery necessary to make the speech impressive, viz., 
42 
believability--that power of delivery that drives the message home; 
facial involvement--that part of delivery that complements any physical 
gesture; and dramatization--the orator's artistic ability to illustrate 
to his audience his intended meaning. Thus believability, facial 
involvement and dramatization will help the audience relate to the 
orator's plan and make it easier for them to agree with his conclusions. 
However, the use of the orator's voice is just as important as his 
attire and physical gestures. The nature and quality of the voice must 
16 be agreeable and not harsh.. That is, Quintilian's ideal orator should 
develop a voice that " ... is easy, strong, rich, flexible, firm, 
sweet, enduring, resonant, pure, carrying far and penetrating the 
ear. 1117 And finally, the orator must be flexible enough to adapt his 
delivery for presentations to the emperor, the senate, the people, to 
magistrates and for public and private trials. 
Thus by utilizing the five parts of rhetoric, the orator can now 
adapt his delivery to the three basic kinds of speeches, viz., panegyric 
(where praise is given to a local hero or to the gods); deliberative 
(the attempt to advise and recommend action to be taken); and forensic 
(the bringing and rebutting of charges). The forensic speech is treated 
18 by Quintilian in great length. What is essential for the orator to 
remember is the basic format. To prepare the audience the orator must 
include an exordium, i.e., an introduction to the subject. Next, a 
statement of the facts of the case should be presented, followed by an 
attempt by the orator to prove his plea. The fourth section of a 
forensic speech involves the refutation. The orator here must prove 
an argument to be invalid, or statements made by his opponent to be 
false, by using evidence that refutes his opponent's charge. What 
43 
follows next is the peroration or a very brief recapitulation of the 
major points of the case. 
The next concern of Quintilian regarding the nature of rhetoric was 
whether rhetoric is an art. For him rhetoric is an art, though he never 
claimed it to be a body of factual knowledge. There were those like 
Plato who viewed rhetoric simply as a knack derived from experience, 
i.e., rhetoric is a natural gift. Others, like Lysias, argued that 
oratory was practiced by uneducated men, barbarians and even slaves 
19 before Tisias and Corax advanced the teaching of rhetoric as art. 
Quintilian's rebuttal was simple yet quite effective. First, he says, 
"it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that everything which 
h b h f . . . d . ..20 art as roug t to per ection originate in nature. That is, 
II wounds were bound up long before medicine developed into an 
art. .. 21 Further, ". . primitive man built himself a hut without 
the assistance of art. 1122 In like fashion races indulged in singing 
and dancing long before music became as art. Therefore he concludes: 
... if any kind of speech is to be called eloquence, I will 
admit that it existed before it was an art. If on the other 
hand not every man that speaks is an orator and primitive 
man did not speak like an orator, my opponents must needs 
acknowledge that oratory is the product of art and did not 
exist before it.23 
A final question resolved by Quintilian pertains to the material of 
rhetoric. Earlier writers, like Aristotle, had thought that the topic 
f 1 . . h . b. f 24 o po itics was t e approrpiate su Ject matter or oratory. Plato 
insisted that oratory should include private and domestic affairs as 
25 
well. However Quintilian asserts ". . . the material of rhetoric is 
composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment .. 
What Quintilian means is that an orator should never be ignorant (or 
considered ignorant) of the subject on which he has to speak. That is, 
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an orator can only speak on those subjects he has studied. Does it 
follow then that a builder would speak better on the subject of building 
and a musician on music? While it is true that the builder or musician 
would know more about his art than the unlearned, it is not necessarily 
true that he could speak of his art in the most forceful way. As 
Quintilian points out, "Even an illiterate peasant who is a party to a 
suit will speak better on behalf of his case than an orator who does 
not know what the subject in dispute may.be. 1127 Quiltilian is driving 
home two points. First, an untrained person will never perform a task 
like the artist himself. For example, " ... when an untrained person 
binds up a wound, he will not be a physician, but he will be acting as 
28 
one." Likewise the untrained builder or musician may attempt to speak 
like an orator but without the proper rhetorical training he would not 
have the ability to speak as a true orator. A second point (and perhaps 
the most important) is that the orator before he attempts to speak will 
always investigate the topic. So, as noted above, the material of 
rhetoric, according to Quintilian, is composed of everything that comes 
before the orator for treatment, and the only limitation is that the 
orator only speaks on the subjects he has studied. 29 
Characteristics of the Ideal Teacher 
For Quintilian, in the development of an orator, "The nature of 
the individual boy and the care devoted to his education make all the 
difference. 1130 That difference between success and failure begins 
when the child is born. Therefore to ensure success Quintilian urges 
that the parents should be as highly educated as possible. 31 Even in 
infancy it is desirable that the child be subjected to language spoken 
45 
correctly. Further, parents should conceive the highest hopes for their 
child, viz., that the child grow strong in body by regular physical 
exercise, that he come to enjoy speaking and writing correctly and that 
h th . t f h. t . 11 h. d . 1 . . . 32 e sense e in erest o is paren s in a is e ucationa activities. 
Another way parents may guarantee success for their child, 
according to Quintilian, is to hire a nurse who has the highest 
credentials. Thus the child's nurse should possess good moral character. 
Since it is the worst impressionsthat are most durable, and since it 
will be the nurse who the child hears first, it is imperative that the 
33 
nurse use language correctly. Quintilian's point is well taken for 
the child must not " . become accustomed even in infancy to a style 
34 
of speech which he will subsequently have to unlearn." 
Still another way to ensure success for the young child is for the 
parents to pay attention to their child's choice of companions. 
Quintilian requires that all companions have the same high moral 
character and possess the ability to speak language accurately. In 
like fashion, the same qualities must prevail in the companion teacher, 
i.e., the "paedagogus" or slave-tutor. Since the role of the slave-
tutor involves the general supervision of the child, including escorting 
him to school and seeing that he stays out of trouble, it would be best 
for such a teacher to have a thorough education. 35 Quintilian realized 
that he was describing the ideal nurse, the ideal companions, as well 
as the ideal "paedagogus." However, if such quality people are 
unavailable he insists that 
• . . there should be one person at any rate attached to the 
boy who has some knowledge of speaking and who will if any 
incorrect expression should be used by nurse or tutor in the 
presence of the child under their charge, at once correct 
the error and prevent its becoming a habit. But it must be 
clearly understood that this is only a remedy and that the 
ideal course is that indicated above.36 
Once sufficient progress has been made by the young boy in his 
studies, the parents are now ready to place him under the direction of 
a rhetorician. Likewise the parents should inquire whether the teacher 
is of good character. It is interesting to note that Quintilian seems 
to be more concerned about the character of the teacher than the 
teacher's expertise in his subject matter or his pedagogical methods. 
It must be remembered that Quintilian's quest is the production of the 
ideal orator who is a good man skilled in the art of effective speech. 
Thus it is only natural that Quintilian would recommend that the young 
orator's teacher possess superior moral character, for, 
• as a rule boys are on the verge of manhood when 
transferred to the teacher of rhetoric and continue with 
him even when they are young men: consequently we must 
spare no effort to secure that the purity of the teacher's 
character should preserve those of tenderer years from 
corruption, while its authority should keep the bolder 
spirits from breaking out into license.37 
Thus, the teacher of rhetoric, along with having high moral standards, 
should be a sensible man with a good knowledge of teaching. That is, 
he should be willing to communicate on a level that is understandable 
to his students. The teacher should not strive to exalt himself but 
present lessons that are clear and concise. Next, the teacher himself 
should be distinguished for his own eloquence. Quintilian's aim is to 
show that the teacher of rhetoric must be able and ready to demonstrate 
the correct techniques of effective speech. For if a teacher does not 
command excellent oratorical ability or will not condescend to teach 
the more elementary details of rhetoric, Quintilian regards such a one 
38 
as unworthy of the name teacher. Further, the good teacher will not 
attempt to teach too many students at one time. The intent here is to 
46 
demonstrate that each teacher must know and come to appreciate the 
individual differences of his students. Large classes make this task 
difficult, for though he might be friendly to his students he will be 
unable to establish the rapport necessary to attend to the needs of 
each student. Just as 
Vessels with narrow mouths will not receive liquids if too 
much be poured into them at one time, but are easily filled 
if the liquid is admitted in a gentle stream or, it may be, 
drop by drop; similarly you must consider how much a child's 
mind is capable of receiving.39 
When a teacher adheres to the advice of Quintilian, his teaching will 
not be a duty but a labor of love. That is why the skillful teacher 
will make every attempt to ascertain the ability and character of his 
students. He should especially note the power of memory as well as the 
power of imitation in his students, for with these traits a child is 
40 teachable. Quintilian's intent is to prove that every future orator 
must possess a keen memory and be able to imitate those actions of the 
teacher that will enhance his speaking ability, viz., mood projection, 
believability, facial involvement and dramatization. 
Another trait of the good teacher is his ability to govern the 
b h . f h' d b h . f h' d' . l' 41 e avior o is stu ents y t e strictness o is 1sc1p 1ne. 
Quintilian does not mean the regular custom of flogging prevalent in 
the schools of his day. In fact Quintilian argues that flogging is 
the worst method for maintaining discipline in the classroom. He 
suggests that flogging is a disgraceful form of punishment designed 
to control slaves. Such punishment may compel a child to work harder 
but " •• what are you to do with him when he is a young man no longer 
47 
amenable to such threats and confronted with tasks of far greater 
difficulty? 1142 The ideal teacher should know that children are helpless 
48 
and easily victimized and for that reason adopt a parental attitude 
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toward his students. Such an attitude of love, kindness and patience 
will help transform the young scholar into an effective speaker. For if 
undue severity in correcting faults is relied on, the student may easily 
become discouraged. Quintilian's plea is that the ideal teacher will 
continually support and encourage the student by making study a 
44 pleasure. That is why Quintilian discourages a teacher from thinking 
he must occupy the whole day with work. On the contrary, students need 
some relaxation (though not unlimited) such as a holiday or the playing 
of games, and when they return they are ready to be ". . spurred on 
by praise, delighted by success and ready to weep over failure. 1145 
Finally, Quintilian's central piece of advice warrants a lengthy 
quotation. In summarizing the effective teacher he says: 
Let him therefore adopt a parental attitude to his pupils, 
and regard himself as the representative of those who have 
committed their children to his charge. Let him be free 
from vice himself and refuse to tolerate it in others. 
Let him be strict but not austere, genial but not too 
familiar: for austerity will make him unpopular, while 
familiarity breeds contempt. Let his discourse continually 
turn on what is good and honourable; the more he admonishes, 
the less he will have to punish. He must control his temper 
without shutting his eyes to faults requiring correction: 
his instruction must be free from affectation, his industry 
great, his demands on his class continuous, but not extra-
vagant. In correcting faults he must avoid sarcasm and 
above all abuse: for teachers whose rebukes seem to imply 
positive dislike discourage industry. It will still be 
found that fuller nourishment is provided by the living 
voice, more especially when it proceeds from the teacher 
himself, who, if his pupils are rightly instructed, should 
be the object of their affection and respect.46 
The Moral Training of the Orator 
Throughout the Institutes of Oratory Quintilian is intent on 
showing how best to nourish the powers of eloquence by teaching oratory. 
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Yet eloquence alone wfll not suffice, for the perfect orator, according 
to Quintilian, is not only an excellent speaker but should also be a 
worthy human being. "The first essential," he says, "for such as one is 
that he should be a good man •. 1147 What follows are Quintilian's 
recommendations for producing good moral character. 
It is important to cultivate proper inclinations in the young by 
exposing them to parents who have high moral character. Parents, then 
must help the child to develop the ability to distinguish between right 
and wrong action. For example, the child must be taught that it is right 
to be unselfish since this is a virtue prized and rewarded by sensible 
people. Even at an early age the parents must appeal to the reasoning 
powers of the child. Likewise, reason should dictate to the child that 
honesty and self-control are virtues that belong to the man of high 
character, viz., his father or one of the local heroes. On the other 
hand, Quintilian warns, parents must not spoil their off spring by a soft 
upbringing, by using vulgar speech or by singing foul soungs at dinner 
parties. 48 If moral character is not emphasized and practiced by the 
parents and all those associated with the child (e.g., his nurse, his 
companions, his slave-tutor), it will be impossible to produce a worthy 
human being. 
Next, as the child matures, Quintilian recommends that he must 
acquire a complete knowledge of all that is just and honorable. For 
" ... virtue, . despite the fact that it is in part derived from certain 
1 . 1 · 11 . b f d b . . .. 49 natura impu ses, wi require to e per ecte y instruction. Thus 
the student, with the help of his teacher, should select those authors 
to imitate whose themes are directed toward the topics of courage, 
justice, loyalty and self-control. Quintilian urges the student to 
50 
read the works of writers and thinkers such as: Pindar, Menander, 
Thucydides, Herodotus, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, 
50 Virgil and Lucretius, to name only a few. The teacher should further 
organize each lesson so that the impressions made by such writers and 
thinkers assist the student in discerning correct behavior, i.e., each 
51 lesson should convey some sound moral lesson. And, if the student 
is to write out the various aphorisms, moral essays and the delineations 
52 
of character, he should commit them to memory. Thus the potential 
orator, according to Quintilian, should examine literature that presents 
virtuous action worthy of imitation. However the acquisition of moral 
virtue is the result of a long course of arduous study, i.e., the energies 
of a lifetime are needed not for the preparation of a single speech but 
for a life of excellence. Quintilian confesses that to possess good 
moral character depends mainly on the will to succeed. It is not enough 
just to read and emulate virtuous men. The aspiring orator must resolve 
that he truly and sincerely desires a life of virtue. The contention of 
Quintilian is that if the student will desire good moral character he 
will learn and manifest those principles that will lead to a life of 
. d h . 53 virtue an appiness. Further, the aim of Quintilian is to demonstrate 
that moral excellence (right thinking coupled with right action) should 
be regarded as logically meritorious, and the student who is gifted with 
. 11. '11 h . . d f . 54 inte igence wi c oose virtue instea o vice. The reason for such 
action seems obvious to Quintilian. His standard, by which actions are 
deemed right or wrong, rests on the authority of Roman tradition which 
emphasized basic loyalties to family, duty, and nation. Thus, actions 
that would disgrace one's family, or failure to perform one's duty to 
country, he thought were wrong. The gifted student, he argued, would 
51 
come to know and appreciate the Roman virtues of justice, purity, 
55 prudence, temperance and honesty. And assuredly the future orator 
will have much to say on such topics as justice, self-control and piety. 
For if the orator is to be worthy of trust, he must possess the moral 
character that befits that trust, i.e., a man of honor which greed 
cannot corrupt, influence seduce or fear dismay. 
As outlined by Quintilian, the moral training of the orator should 
begin in the home. The parents must teach and demonstrate the value of 
moral excellence while correcting the child for inappropriate behavior. 
In like manner the nurse and slave-tutor must help the child continue to 
learn what is deemed acceptable behavior. At school it is imperative 
that the skillful teacher not corrupt the morals of the future orator 
but insist that the boy's actions be unselfish, honest and temperate. 
As soon as the boy can read and write effectively, the teacher should 
suggest authors who will help the young student discover and desire a 
life of virtue. Finally, the young student is instructed to honor 
his family and discharge his duty to his country. In order adequately 
to fulfill this last requirement, the student must acquire and lead a 
life of moral excellence. 
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CHAPTER IV 
QUINTILIAN'S CRITICISM OF GREEK AND 
EARLY ROMAN RHETORICAL EDUCATION 
Quintilian's quest for the ideal orator made him examine carefully 
the educational legacy he inherited. He was determined to seek out the 
strengths and weaknesses found in the traditional Greek and Roman 
educational scheme. In fact, his purpose was to examine the Greek and 
Roman rhetorical educational method to determine its suitability for 
producing the ideal orator. Earlier in Chapter II the nature of 
rhetoric was examined in the writings of Quintilian's predecessors 
(Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero). Their recommendations for 
educational excellence placed the teaching of rhetoric in a secondary 
position or omitted it completely. Quintilian, in contrast, viewed 
the teaching of rhetoric as the foundation for the education of his 
ideal orator. This chapter will present Quintilian's criticism of 
Greek and early Roman rhetorical education. The topics discussed will 
include: 
legacy. 
(1) the Greek educational legacy and (2) the Roman educational 
The Greek Educational Legacy 
In Greece, five centuries before Quintilian, educational emphasis 
centered upon the simple instrumental values of literacy and the use of 
writing to record literature for public recitation. Later, men like 
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Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle addressed the problem of the training 
and schooling of the young, extended literacy, and constructed intellec-
tual environments for achieving the end of education, viz., producing 
disposed men fit to assume the duties of life within the city-state. 1 
Thus was born the notion that the ideally educated man was to be a well-
rounded individual. That is, the ideal was an individual both beautiful 
and good, rooted in the arete of political man, a servant of the polis. 
To this was added other ideal characteristics, such as that the educated 
man would possess esthetic sensitivity as well as physical prowess and 
that he would exhibit oratorical skill and display forensic proficiency 
in the public assembly. The difficulties in achieving such educational 
goals are numerous. The idea that men should be educated is not in 
question; however, -the difficulty lies in how these educators would 
achieve their desired goals. Isocrates, Plato, nor Aristotle ~xplained 
the pedagogical technique necessary to produce the ideal cultivated 
person. Their goals for education were strictly utopian. The Greeks 
desired well-rounded individuals but failed to see that most of their 
students did not have the intellectual and physical capacity to achieve 
such perfection. Also, the Grecians assumed that their students desired 
educational perfection, i.e., the acquisition of esthetic sensitivity, 
physical prowess, oratorical skill, forensic proficiency, and 
philosophical knowledge, while the vast majority of their students 
desired practical educ~tion that emphasized vocational skills, rhetoric 
that would make them successful in politics, and forensic proficiency 
that would produce wealth and personal advancement. In short, the 
educational goals of the Greeks were too idealistic in that the students 
could not achieve such goals. While it is true they did produce 
students with some physical prowess and oratorical skill, they never 
were successful in forming the ideal cultivated individual. 
Another weakness in the educational scope of the Grecians can be 
seen in their personification of "paideia." Paideia included both 
culture of the mind, or civilized life, and the influences, processes 
and techniques for the making of 'the educated man. As Lucas notes, 
"Paideia was an ideal of personal life enriched and nurtured by the 
values of classical culture, a precious possession imparted through 
2 
education." But again, this harmonious synthesis of the developed 
mind in a superb body was rarely attained by the Greeks. One of the 
reasons for the failure was that intellectual excellence, artistic 
harmony, and physical beauty encompassed more than students could 
attain. Another cause for failure is cited by Butts when he says, 
The fifth century goal of the all around development 
of an individual's body, mind and character as the road to 
good citizenship began to give way to a greater emphasis 
upon training of the individual's intellectual faculties, 
principally by means of literary and philosophical studies 
and a corresponding de-emphasis upon civic, artistic and 
physical development.3 
According to Butts, then, the broad educational goal of the Greeks gave 
way to a much narrower goal, viz., the attainment of intellectual 
excellence. In fact, philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle 
argued that the best educated person is one who has trained his 
intellectual capacities as highly as possible. 4 However, the new 
emphasis on the study of philosophy proved to have little application 
for service to the state, other than for the education of rulers. 
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A third reason for the shift away from paideia was the introduction 
of the Sophists to Athenian education. Generally the Sophistic lectures 
were given in the spirit of entertainment rather than education. Their 
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only claim was the promise of instilling in their students the ability 
to persuade and control an audience successfully. Their promise was 
rarely fulfilled because their students attempted to persuade audiences 
with fallacious arguments and inaccurate data. It should be noted that 
Plato viewed Sophistic rhetoric as defeating the systematic search for 
ultimate truth by means of shallow speech-making in promising social 
and political success. 5 Nevertheless, the Greeks were extremely proud 
of their language and of having perfect command of it. To the Athenian 
Greeks, those who could speak well were deemed powerful, while those 
who could not use persuasive speech were thought powerless. The 
Sophistic art of persuasion did not advance the Greek notion of paideia; 
on the contrary, it assured students that persuasive speech would lead 
to political and economic success in public life. 
Though the Greeks rarely attained their educational goal of the 
developed mind in a superb body, it was still an aim worth pursuing. 
And the historic mission of schools in the Hellenistic period continued 
to preserve, perpetuate, and transmit that Greek paideia. However, the 
Hellenistic Greeks, like their predecessors, overlooked the aesthetic, 
moral and physical development, stressing instead intellectual and/or 
rhetorical training. The Hellensits, like the earlier Greeks, attended 
more to the production of the cultivated person than to the teaching 
process. In short, the demand of education was for intellectual 
activity that would take advantage of opportunities for personal 
aggrandizement and achievement, but such a system encouraged the 
survival of but a few wealthy students. 
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The Roman Educational Legacy 
Roman educational influence may be viewed from two perspectives. 
The first perspective views it as an integral part of the history of 
Hellenic civilization. That is, before 500 B.C., Roman education, 
growing out of a peasant folk society, was directed by the family and 
guided by the aim to induct the children into the customs and traditions 
of the group in order to perpetuate its folkways. The educational 
goals were personal as well as practical, instilling in the children 
reverence for the gods, peity towards their parents, respect for laws 
and, especially for the boys, the skills of war. The Romans called 
this educational aim virtus. That is, virtus was identified as the 
Roman ideal of education. Virtus meant an individual both vigorous 
and virtuous who fun~tioned as a contributing member of the state. As 
Kane views it, 
It resembled the ideal of Sparta, but with the very 
important difference that the individual did not exist for 
the state, but the state for the individual. This ideal 
emphasized character; it intelligently recognized that 
character is made up of habits, and it wanted these habits 
to be good.6 
However, the Roman educational goal of achieving virtus has several 
flaws. First, the Romans had not perfected a teaching method that 
could form the vigorous and virtuous individual they envisioned. 
Likewise, there is no guarantee that when an individual acts according 
to the dictates of society his action is prompted by pure motives or 
whether his action is performed in order to receive some kind of 
positive reinforcement. Also, if an individual must be coerced to be 
virtuous, the result seems to be a denial of the true Roman ideal of 
virtus. Finally, the Romans seemed to think that only the vigorous 
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and virtuous individuals were capable of contributing to the welfare of 
the state. This idea contains the assumption that those who did 
contribute to the welfare of the state were vigorous and virtuous. A 
soldier, for example, could easily support and make significant contribu-
tions to the state and be neither vigorous nor virtuous. 
Though the Romans did not achieve the educational aim of virtus, 
they continued to pursue it. That is why the basic aim in the early 
stage of Roman educational practice was moral (i.e., a patriotic 
respect for authority and tradition) rather than literary. For that 
reason one of the first virtues that went into the makeup of Roman 
education's virtuous citizen was piety, strict obedience to the command 
of the gods. That is, the good moral person would respect authority and 
tradition. Roman parents believed that obedience to the gods would 
ensure obedience in the home and to. the state. Other virtues encouraged 
in the home included constantia, the manly courage of fortitude; 
honesty and prudence in the management of one's affairs; and finally, 
pudor or the practice of modesty in dress, speech and public deportment. 
Thus, the major Roman virtues included bravery, honor, self-discipline, 
reverence for the gods, and duty to country and family. The educational 
procedure used by the Romans for attaining such goals rested upon 
imitation. The Romans believed that by watching their elders, children 
would form strong moral character and a desire to serve the state. 
The awkwardness of this proposal was that too often what the children 
emulated was immoral character and a desire to attain wealth at the 
expense of the state. However, the Romans continued to stress that 
these virtues should be acquired and practiced. So in the Early 
Republic (509 - 265 B.C.) the basic purpose of education was to produce 
good fathers, contributing citizens, and capable soldiers. 
During the middle Republican years (250- 30 B.C.) the Romans found 
themselves unable to resist Hellenizing influences. Since Greek slaves 
were readily obtainable, wealthy Romans used them as tutors or 
litteratores to teach elementary subjects such as reading and writing. 
The Greek influence on elementary schooling extended also to higher 
learning. This is not to suggest that the Grecian influence solved all 
of the problems within Roman education. The Romans implemented the 
Greek practice of educating the sons of wealthy parents. Also, it was 
during the late Republican times that the school of rhetor appeared. 
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The rhetor or rhetorician opened private academies and attracted the 
wealthier Roman students who desired to learn the art of public speaking. 
Though some attention was given to geography, music, elementary mathe-
matics, geometry and astronomy, the study of rhetoric (adopted from 
the Greeks) permitted the Romans to advance their basic educational 
goal, viz., the balanced adjustment of the individual to the social 
group. It should be noted that this goal, unlike earlier utopian goals, 
was actively pursued by the school of the rhetor. Since the Romans 
were doers rather than searchers (as some of the Greeks had been), the 
ability to speak correctly and forcefully was emphasized mainly as a 
weapon for offense and defense in the public forum and in the Senate. 
The second perspective regarding Roman educational practice sees 
Roman education as developing its own identity. Though influenced by 
Greek education which stressed the ideal of the well-rounded 
individual, Roman education could be characterized as extremely 
practical. That is, Roman educators logically gave more emphasis to 
realizable purposes such as preparing students for careers in politics 
and public service. At this point in time the Romans realized the 
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futility of pursuing idealistic educational goals. They reasoned that 
such goals were impractical and contrary to Roman political and 
institutional life. 
In Rome, three types of schools that stressed the practical aspect 
of education had developed. The first school, or elementary school, was 
taught by a free man of freed slave, known in Latin as the litterator, 
or teacher of letters. He gave instruction in reading and writing to 
children between the ages of seven and 12. He also taught his students 
the basic principles of counting. The elementary school, or ludus as 
it was called, constituted the first five years of formal training. The 
school day began at dawn and lasted until dusk. It was a school 
characterized by coercion and chastisement. A quote from Carcopino 
best describes the primary schools of the first century A.D. He says: 
On the whole we are compelled to admit that at the most 
glorious period of the empire the schools entirely failed to 
fulfill the duties which we expect of our schools today. They 
undermined instead of strengthened the children's morals; 
they mishandled the children's bodies instead of developing 
them; and if they succeeded in furnishing their minds with a 
certain amount of information, they were not calculated to 
perform any loftier or nobler task. The pupils left school 
with the heavy luggage of a few practical and commonplace 
notions laboriously acquired. Instead of happy memories, 
serious and fruitful ideas, any sort of intellectual curiosity 
vital to later life, school children carried away the gloomy 
recollection of years wasted in senseless, stumbling 
repetitions punctuated by savage punishments. Popular 
education then in Rome was a failure ... 7 
Next, from the ludus school the student progressed to the school 
conducted by the grammaticus, or teacher of grammar. The purpose of 
the grammar school was to continue the emphasis on practical education 
by providing a modicum of general learning for all students. Also, 
the teacher of grammar prepared his students for advanced studies. 
A more exact picture of the curriculum in the school of the grammaticus 
was probably that described by Cicero: 
in music, rhythms, sounds and measures; in geometry, 
lines, figures, dimensions and magnitudes; in astronomy, the 
revolution of the sky, the rising, setting and movement of 
heavenly bodies; in literature, the study of poets, the 
learning of histories, the explanation of words and proper 
intonation in speaking them; and the theory of oratory, 
invention, style, arrangement, memory and delivery.8 
From Cicero's account most of the Greek Liberal arts were being taught 
in Rome. This does not mean that the liberal arts were taught well or 
that the students understood the significance and function of the arts. 
On the contrary, most of the students received only a surface knowledge 
in subjects like grammar, rhetoric, music, astronomy, logic, and 
geometry. The reason for the failure and ineffectiveness in the school 
of the grammaticus is not difficult to trace. The students were 
younger adolescents who usually hated both the teacher and the school. 
Oftentimes these students could not perform the tasks outlined by the 
teacher of grammar because the ludus school had also failed to prepare 
them properly for the grammar school. The students were frustrated 
because of their poor educational background, beaten when unable to 
perform for the grammatical teacher, and shamed by teacher and parents 
for low classroom performance. Also, students found the schoolday long 
and boring. It would seem that teachers viciously attacked more 
students than they ever helped to appreciate the quest for knowledge. 
The grammar school of Rome was a total failure. 
The third type of school that had developed in Rome was the school 
of rhetoric which provided a course of instruction lasting two to five 
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years. These schools, like previous Roman schools, had been established 
for the well-born Roman youth who was destined for a career in politics 
and public service. The rhetor or teacher of rhetoric delivered, 
" .•. theoretical lectures on the foundations of eloquence, thesis 
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writing, speech making, disputations and public declamations aimed 
ultimately at turning out skilled orators for the market place. 119 There 
was almost no pressure put on the student to develop his intellectual 
skills nor was it necessary for him to acquire moral excellence. 
Without these two major assets student declamations contained inaccurate 
information and lacked personal magnetism. The Roman rhetorical school 
did not stress the importance of pitch, force, duration, quality, and 
resonance in voice production. The students also lacked the fundamental 
knowledge of pronunciation, articulation, and enunciation of words 
expected of a proper orator. As a whole, the students could not 
introduce, organize, and effectively support the topic they discussed. 
Finally, the graduate of the Roman rhetrocial school was a clever 
manipulator of words instead of a broadly prepared statesman. Such 
was the educational legacy passed on to Quintilian. 
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CHAPTER V 
AN APPRAISAL OF QUINTILIAN'S 
RHETORICAL EDUCATION 
The burden of this chapter will be to present a critical examina-
tion of Quintilian's view of rhetorical education. The purposes of 
this chapter are (1) to show Quintilian's reaction to the rhetorical 
concepts held by Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero; (2) to present 
Quintilian's innovative rhetorical scheme taking moral virtue as a 
necessary condition for becoming an orator; and (3) to critically 
appraise Quintilian's rhetorical education scheme vis-a-vis those 
theories presented by his predecessors. 
Quintilian records the traditional belief that Marcus Cato (234 -
149 B.C.) was the first Roman to attempt to write a serious educational 
1 
work. However, Cato had not concerned himself with the role of the 
teacher nor did he examine the nature of children. When Quintilian was 
asked to write a treatise on the art of speaking he determined that his 
educational goal would be somewhat different. He states: 
For almost all others who have written on the art of 
oratory have started with the assumption that their readers 
were perfect in all other branches of education and that 
their task was merely to put the finishing touches to their 
rhetorical training; ... I on the other hand hold that the 
art of oratory includes all that is essential for the 
training of an orator, and ... I propose to mould the 
studies of my orator from infancy.2 
The genuine interest of the Institutio Oratoria is not in the general 
information it provides, valuable as that is, but in the fact that it 
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is a candid description and discussion of the educational proposals made 
by Quintilian. This chapter will explore Quintilian's contribution to 
educational theory. The topics discussed will include: (1) an 
appraisal of Quintilian's view of rhetorical education and (2) appropriate 
conclusions and recommendations resulting from the study. 
An Appraisal of Quintilian's Educa.tional Scheme 
When Quintilian was asked by his friends to write something on the 
art of speaking, he resisted their entreaties by saying that several 
distinguished Greek and Roman writers had already addressed the subject. 
They finally convinced him to attempt the task by urging that previous 
writers on the subject had expressed different and at times contradictory 
opinions. Though Quintilian may have had reservations about beginning 
his writing, he had no restraint in addressing the weaknesses in Greek 
and Roman educational thought. 
The goal of education for Quintilian is related to the Greek goal 
of the ideal cultivated individual. He believed, like the early Greeks, 
that education should produce men who would serve the state. Unlike 
the Greeks, he de-emphasized the notion that the ideally educated man 
must be a well-rounded individual. He especially attacked the Greek 
notion of physical prowess. He objected to the practice of individuals 
who rub themselves with oil and kill the mind by over-attention to the 
body; but did not object to the teaching of gymnastics that stressed the 
importance of the proper management of the hands, arms, and feet as a 
part of the art of delivery. Quintilian further believed that the 
Greeks were too preoccupied with the study of philosophy. He reasoned 
that philosophers had never won fame in the public assemblies, nor had 
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they ever taken a prominent part in the government of the state. 
However, Quintilian did recommend that philosophy and all the other 
liberal arts would be thoroughly studied so that the orator would be 
recognized as wise. Without adequate knowledge gained from the study of 
the liberal arts, the orator's speech would lack the element of con-
viction. Here Quintilian showed his disdain for Sophistic rhetoric 
that stressed the value of speechmaking in terms of political or economic 
success. What Quintilian favored was rhetoric that resulted in the 
speaker's ability to speak well. He argued that the orator, without a 
proper knowledge of his subject matter, could not make a presentation 
worthy of acceptance. In like manner, Quintilian rejected the 
Hellenistic Greek practice of stressing the acquisition of intellectual 
virtue without affirming the need for individual moral development. To 
Quintilian, both intellectual virtue and moral virtue must be emphasized 
in order to produce the ideal orator. If the teacher must stress one 
over the other, it would be better to require of the students moral 
virtue, for without moral virtue, he argued, an individual by his 
actions would corrupt the state. Also, what words of an orator would 
be accepted if his reputation is that of a liar, a thief, or a murderer? 
Thus, Quintilian insisted that both intellectual virtue and moral 
virtue should be included in the school curriculum. 
The Roman educational legacy, passed on to Quintilian, accented the 
need for vigorous and virtuous citizens. Quintilian endorsed such goals 
but rejected the attempt made by the Romans to achieve them. That is 
why much of the writing of Quintilian is a strong criticism of the 
pedagogical techniques used in the Roman schools. Though he favored 
any attempt by educators to advance the importance of moral education, 
he viewed the teaching methods employed in the Roman school as totally 
inadequate, even barbaric. He opposed the harsh and brutal treatment 
of students by Roman teachers. He argued that the cruel treatment of 
students leads to poor scholarship and undermined the teacher-student 
relationship necessary for learning. Thus, Quintilian recommended that 
teachers treat students as their own children and instruct them in a 
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firm but loving way. Also, the Roman practice of teaching students by 
the same method, regardless of the difference in age, was rejected by 
Quintilian. He believed that the teacher should be aware of the 
maturational differences in students and adapt his instruction to 
individual needs. The reason is that the effective teacher will not 
burden his students with tasks beyond their ability. That is, the 
teacher must discern how much· material a student's mind is capable of 
receiving. The teacher, he argues, must choose tasks appropriate to the 
student's age and relate the size and difficulty of the task to his 
attention span and capacity. This simple yet humane advice of Quintilian 
has certainly stood the test of time, i.e., different ages demand 
different methods of instruction. 
Finally, Roman education had adopted the procedure of having the 
student study one subject at a time. Quintilian holds that students 
should carry a variety of subjects simultaneously instead of taking 
grammar, geometry, music, and so on in succession. He argues that the 
mind is not confused and made tired by studying various subjects 
throughout the school day. In fact, the study of a variety of subjects 
would serve to refresh and restore the mind since it is considerably 
harder to work at one subject without intermission. 
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A review of Quintilian's educational scheme reveals that he 
identified the ineffective Roman educational practice of mistreating 
students and suggested ways for improvement. His recommendation for 
adapting instruction to fit the individual needs of students is unique 
and praisworthy. His idea that students study a variety of subjects 
simultaneously is considered today a sound pedagogical technique. Also, 
Quintilian believed that the most good in education is done when 
children are young. This idea reinforced future educators t:o. stress 
the need for elementary education where students would learn by precept 
and example. Finally, according to Quintilian, the best teaching 
technique is to instill in students a desire to do well so that in time 
they have no need for a teacher. Such admonition deserves the respect 
of all educators since the learning process does not stop with formal 
education. 
Quintilian's educational scheme was designed to produce the perfect 
orator, i.e., an individual who was liberally educated, skilled in 
considering, juding, and was capable of speaking on the prominent 
issues in public life. Moreover, he claimed that moral virtue is a 
necessary condition for becoming an orator. To support his hypothesis, 
he argues that men of intelligence will always choose virtue. 3 While 
it may be true that intelligent men are better informed as to the 
various moral choices available, it is false to assume that intelligent 
men will always choose virtue instead of vice. Quintilian seems to 
think that just because one knows the right thing to do, he will do it. 
In theory Quintilian's idea is perhaps correct; yet, men of intelligence 
may certainly know the right action that should be performed and still 
be unable to complete the action successfully. The difficulty in 
Quintilian's position is that he does not say that "some intelligent 
men will at times choose virtue;" on the contrary, he says that "all 
intelligent men will always choose virtue." All that is necessary to 
prove his statement false is to produce one example of an intelligent 
man who does not choose virtue. The perfect example would be Cicero, 
described by Quintilian as an intelligent man who, on occasions, chose 
d . . f f . 4 wrong oing in avor o virtue. Quintilian's statement implies also 
that intelligent men do not decide to choose some virtuous acts but 
resolve to choose a life of continuous virtue. The error of this 
proposal is that though men may desire a life of virtue, there is no 
guarantee that some of their actions will not be deemed vicious, evil, 
or wicked. Thus, Quintilian's idea that "all intelligent men will 
always choose virtue" is a false statement. 
Quintilian argues further that an individual cannot learn (i.e., 
gain knowledge from a particular subject) unless he is free from vice. 5 
He believes that vileness and virtue cannot jointly inhabit the same 
person. If this statement were true, then no one could ever gain 
knowledge because the character of man is composed of not only good 
traits but evil traits as well. There is always a little bad or 
wrongdoing in the lives of the best of men. Likewise, the mind of an 
individual may harbour both good and evil thoughts. The awkwardness 
in Quintilian's notion is that he assumed that every man is wholly 
good or wholly evil. The truth of the matter is that the most wicked 
individual might choose to engage in at least one virtuous act. It is 
not within the realm of human possibility for men to live completely 
devoid of vice. If Quintilian's perfect orator is to become a reality, 
he must produce an example of a perfect, virtuous individual, which he 
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did not nor could he do. Quintilian's failure to produce even one 
example of a wholly good individual should have convinced him that such 
an individual had not lived before, but he continued to think that such 
an individual might arise some time in the future. The problem is that 
Quintilian was looking not for just a good man, but a man perfect in all 
his actions. Such a person could never exist, and the reason should be 
obvious. It is not within the realm of human possibility. For 
example, it is not within the realm of human possibility to produce the 
perfect baseball player, i.e., an individual who always catches and 
throws the ball correctly and who always hits a home run. We can no 
more produce the perfect baseball player than Quintilian's scheme can 
produce the perfect moral individual. Quintilian is not content to 
accept an individual who is less than perfect, and therein lies the 
weakness of his argument. 
Quintilian further attempts to support his position by stating 
that the aim of every speech is to convince the judge that the case put 
forward is true and honorable; and, that if a good man and a bad man 
with the same talent, industry, and learning were engaged in battle, 
the better orator will be the better man (i.e., the man who is perfect 
in virtue). The grave mistake made by Quintilian is that if the good 
man should be losing the case, it is permissible for him, according 
to Quintilian, to use fraud or make false statements to the judge in 
order to win the case. Quintilian tries to justify his position on the 
ground that lies can be used if the accused man promises to be a good 
citizen. 6 Quintilian insists that his orator must be an honest man; 
yet, he allows his honest man to lie for the good of his client. At 
this point it is difficult to tell the difference between Quintilian's 
perfect orator and any corrupt lawyer attempting to win a case. To be 
consistent, Quintilian should have argued that the good orator would 
never lie in order to convince the judge. This example of Quintilian's 
ideal orator, who lies to benefit his client, certainly weakens his 
major claim that moral virtue is a necessary condition for becoming 
an orator. Surely man devoid of virtue could, by their persuasive 
speech, convince a judge with or without resorting to lies. 
Just as Quintilian argued that the orator must be wholly virtuous, 
he also argued that the orator must have perfect knowledge of all 
subjects. Even if this task could be accomplished, which is cannot 
as will be shown, it would take the time and patience of one's lifetime 
to accomplish. Quintilian had in mind an individual who has "perfect 
knowledge of all subjects," not just the knowledge of one or two 
subjects. Even in Quintilian's day, the field of subjects was vast. 
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Yet he demands of the orator a thorough knowledge of history, philosophy, 
literature, civil law, and religion, to name only a few. Quintilian 
admits that no person in history, including men like Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, and Cicero, had acquired such perfect knowledge. However, 
he assumed that because no one had acquired perfect knowledge of all 
subjects in the past that it could not be achieved in the future. Is 
there anyone, after the time of Quintilian, who could be cited as 
having perfect knowledge of all subjects? Is there anyone today who 
would be so bold as to declare his proficiency in all subject areas? 
The conclusion is that Quintilian's educational scheme did not produce 
such an orator in his lifetime, nor is there any evidence from history 
to support his notion that such a person could be found who had perfect 
knowledge of all subjects. Thus, Quintilian's recommendation that an 
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orator must have perfect knowledge in all subjects is erroneous because 
the acquisition of "perfect knowledge" is beyond the realm of human 
possibility. To require an individual to possess "perfect virtue" 
and "perfect knowledge" in order to wear the name orator is totally 
unrealistic. Likewise, though superior character and excellent scholar-
ship are useful tools in oration, they are certainly not necessary for a 
speaker to be eloquent. For example, if a speaker, regardless of his 
moral character, has knowledge of only one subject area, he may still 
speak well, i.e., if he convinces his audience that his ideas are true 
and worthy of acceptance. 
A final argument that Quintilian makes, regarding the role of moral 
virtue in the formation of the orator, is that the virtuous man can be 
f d b . . 7 per ecte y instruction. Quintilian believed that good moral character 
would be produced in an individual if his educational formula were 
followed. His method was to begin when a child is born to intelligent 
parents who possess the ability to teach the child to read. Further, 
these parents must see that the child speaks and acts correctly 
according to their dictates. Next, when the child was ready for formal 
training, the parents must select a teacher of high moral character. 
The teacher will recommend to the student the best literature that 
emphasizes those principles of right living. Finally, the student 
engaged in the study of rhetoric to learn to speak and act in the most 
correct and proper manner. Quintilian believed that the produce of 
the educator's art would produce the individual who possessed perfect 
virtue in addition to perfect knowledge. Such an individual could 
wear the name orator. 
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The contention of Quintilian is unsound. His first premise, that 
a child should have intelligent parents, rests on the assumption that 
the child has a choice. Obviously the child has no choice and could 
easily acquire parents devoid of knowledge and virtue. Such parents 
might not have the ability to teach reading nor instill virtue in the 
child. His next premise presumes that by selecting a teacher of high 
moral character the student would emulate the moral action of the teacher. 
Though this idea appears to have merit, there is no guarantee that the 
student's attitude or behavior would be changed from vice to virtue 
simply by associating with such a teacher. Also, Quintilian does not 
say how the teacher will induce such a change in the student's character. 
He believed that the teacher would present to the student the best moral 
literature and that those moral lessons would cause the student to choose 
virtue instead of vice. This idea of Quintilian is at best only wishful 
thinking. Even if a person read the best moral literature and decided 
to choose virtue over vice, it would be difficult to determine precisely 
if it were the literature or some other factor responsible for the 
change in behavior. Again, Quintilian's postulation rests on the 
assumption that by reading moral literature one will act accordingly. 
Countless examples abound of individuals who have read good moral 
literature and yet chose vice instead of virtue. It may be that many 
criminals in prison were at one time or another introduced to moral 
literatuer which obviously did not ~ause them to choose the virtuous 
life. Thus, Quintilian's claim that reading moral literature produces 
good moral character is false. 
Quintilian's final comment, that by studying rhetoric the student 
will come to speak with eloquence and acquire moral excellence, is also 
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misleading. By studying rhetoric, as outlined by Quintilian in the 
Institutes of Oratory, a few gifted students could gain the ability to 
speak eloquently. However, the study of rhetoric will not produce moral 
excellence in an individual. First, it is possible for an individual 
to speak eloquently without having high moral standards. Quintilian 
declared that Demosthenes and Cicero were great men who deserve 
veneration because of their eloquent speech; yet later he condemns 
them for not having attained moral perfection. Also, Quintilian never 
states exactly how the student will acquire moral excellence by 
studying rhetoric. This oversight by Quintilian destroys his entire 
argument. It is as unreasonable to argue that the study of rhetoric 
will produce moral virtue in an individual, as it is to argue that the 
study of music will produce a knowledge of epiphenomenalism in an 
individual. 
Finally, Quintilian's hypothesis that moral virtue is a necessary 
condition for becoming an orator must be rejected since his argument 
is unsound. It is impossible for an individual to acquire "perfect 
virtue" and "perfect knowledge" of all subjects. Likewise, Quintilian 
failed to demonstrate how moral virtue is acquired by an individual 
following his educational scheme. And, Quintilian admitted that he 
had never discovered the perfect orator except in his own mind. 
In conclusion, Quintilian set out to describe the education of the 
perfect orator whose life would personify the highest moral character. 
He pictured such a one as perfect in every phase of his development, 
i.e., ideal parents and ideal teachers would shape the future orator 
so that he could speak on such topics as justice, fortitude, abstinence, 
self-control, and piety with great persuasion and knowledge. Such a 
dream as that of Quintilian is appreciated because it involves man's 
search for better schools, a better society, and a more noble person. 
Can the ideal orator be produced? We can no more produce the ideal 
orator than we can the ideal teacher. However, few educational writers 
have advanced the teaching of oratory beyond Quintilian's massive work. 
He raised all the educational issues demanding attention in his day 
and many of today. And finally, the ideas of Quintilian are still 
worthy of serious study in our time. 
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ENDNOTES 
1Marcus Fabius Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, translated by 
H. E. Butler, Vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 
p. 3 79. 
2Ibid. , p. 7. 
3Quintilian, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 357. 
4rbid., p. 363f. 
5rbid., p. 357. 
61bid., p. 379. 
7Ibid., p. 387. 
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